111
For the similarities between the ways in which we perceive real, historical, theatrical, and fictional beings, see also: Bordwell (1989), Boruah, Galatzer-Levy and Cohler, Gergen (1990), Gerrig, Gerrig and Allbritton, Gordon, Oatley, Ortony et al, Schwarz, Siebenschuh, M. Smith, and States.
112
The concept of «theory of mind» comes originally from the fields of primatology and animal cognition and has to do with the degree to which animals, especially monkeys and apes, show evidence of being able to understand the thought processes of others. It has become a key concept in infant and child development, as it is apparent that humans are not born with such a capacity but that it develops during the critical early years of childhood, and it plays a key role in contemporary versions of human evolution. See Byrne and Whiten, Carruthers and Smith, Deacon, Dunbar, Nelson, Vauclair, and Whiten.
113
The issue of «representation», the creation of some sort of symbolic description or mental model of external reality, is a complicated and subtle one in cognitive science. The classic study is the book by Johnson-Laird.
114
Concerning the question of sympathy and empathy, see Gelernter, Jackendoff, Johnson (1993), Oatley, and Restak. For some inquiries into the differences between human (biological) and artificial (computational) intelligence, see Caudill, Clark (1997), Dreyfus and Dreyfus, Franklin, Lloyd, Nadeau, and Norman. On the fundamental differences between human beings and other animals, see Deacon and Wolfe.
115
It is ironic but telling that the distinction made by Lacan/Sullivan between the «human animal» (made of flesh and blood) and the «human subject» (made of language) -a distinction Sullivan considers essential- is almost an exact duplication of the distinction made by Ellmann et al. between the «human being made of flesh and character made of words» -a distinction Sullivan considers untenable.
116
The major problem with the concepts of «the subject» and «subjectivity» as used by Althusser, Foucault, Lacan, and poststructuralist and/or postmodern theorists in general, is its deterministic power that leaves very little or no room for individual agency. See the important book by P. Smith, who makes a heroic attempt to salvage some meaning for the term by «discerning» it. See also Soper and Wojciehowski.
117
Varela et al. represent the main source for the concept of the «embodied mind;» see also Clark. Johnson's (1987) revolutionary approach to metaphorical language (from Lakoff and Johnson) as based on the mind's concept of the body is a landmark in cognitive science (see also Johnson 1991). Hobson argues persuasively for some term that includes both of the concepts of brain and mind, and more, in a single word. Lacking such a term, which would more realistically and effectively describe the reality of biological cognition, he settles on this hyphenated version. Other variants, such as brain-mind, mind/brain, brain/mind, and so forth, also appear frequently in the literature of cognitive science.
118
All modern study of emotion based on up-to-date concepts of how the brain actually functions insists that emotion and cognition are inevitably and intimately connected. To conceive and talk of one without reference to the other is always a mistake. Absolutely fundamental are the books by Damasio and LeDoux. See also Gordon, Oatley, and Ortony et al.
119
Lynch's research into the relationship between speaking and blood pressure adds a whole new dimension to Bakhtin's concept of «dialogism», as well as stressing again the inseparability of mind and body, emotion and cognition.
120
Consciousness is never simply a matter of some sort of mystical and all-powerful animate «language» or «ideology» that «inscribes» something called «subjectivity» on passive human beings (an idea derived from Saussure's absolutely discredited view of the passive «listener» in the «speech circuit»). Virtually no one today subscribes to the old concept of a unitary and self-knowing individual (as many poststructuralists continue to affirm of those «humanists» whom they criticize), but that does not mean that we have to deny all agency (see note 116) to persons. The human being is a unique biological entity, with equally unique experiences and memories, situated in a complex temporal and historical context, who both acts and is acted upon in dialogical relationships that are both internal and social.