The subject of Cervantine paradoxy is already latent in an important study by Manuel Durán, La ambigüedad en el «Quijote» (Xalapa: Universidad Veracruzana, 1960). A study of the encounter between Don Quixote and Don Diego de Miranda that centers, not specifically on the problem of self-knowledge, but on the cuerdo loco paradox, is Francisco Márquez Villanueva, «El Caballero del Verde Gabán y su reino de paradoja», Personajes y temas del «Quijote» (Madrid: Taurus, 1975), 147-227. As will become apparent, I owe a great debt to this essay, although my reading of these episodes differs in many important respects from that of Márquez Villanueva. A discussion, with ample bibliography, of paradoxes involving both the tale of Don Quixote and its protagonist is found in Daniel Eisenberg, A Study of «Don Quixote» (Newark, DE: Juan de la Cuesta, 1987), pp. 188-193. Other studies that note the centrality of paradox in Don Quixote include: Joseph R. Jones, «The Liar Paradox in Don Quixote II, 51»,Hispanic Review 54 (1986), pp. 183-193; and James Parr, «Don Quixote»: An Anatomy of Subversive Discourse (Newark, DE: Juan de la Cuesta, 1988), especially pp. 103-119. Studies that discuss the tradition of Renaissance paradoxy chiefly with respect to Cervantes' other works are: Alban K. Forcione, Cervantes and the Humanist Vision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982); by the same author, Cervantes and the Mystery of Lawlessness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); and Adrienne Lasker Martín, Cervantes and the Burlesque Sonnet (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), pp. 79-80. The standard work on Renaissance paradoxy is Rosalie Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966). (N. from the A.)

It is worth noting that Don Quixote is never quoted as using this sobriquet for Don Diego. It is the narrative voice, presumably Cide Hamete, who claims, without direct quotation, that Don Quixote accorded Don Diego such a knightly epithet. As I shall discuss presently, despite such false clues from the narrator, the passages about the encounter between the two hidalgos reveal that, after carefully scrutinizing Don Diego, Don Quixote considers that other character to follow a very different «profession» from his own, one which the protagonist fails to specify-probably because the profession of a more than moderately wealthy, rural hidalgo falls outside his chivalric schemata. (N. from the A.)

Sebastián de Cobarruvias, Tesoro de la Lengua Castellana o Española (Madrid: Ediciones Turner, 1984; orig., 1611), p. 852. (N. from the A.)

On the distinction between paradox and antinomy, and on the antinomies related to the Paradox of the Liar, see Willard V. Quine, «The Ways of Paradox», The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 3-20. (N. from the A.)

Among the more recent studies on the Paradox of the Liar, see: Charles Parsons, «The Liar Paradox», Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (1974), pp. 381-412; Robert L. Martin, The Paradox of the Liar (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); also by Martin, Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and John Bariwise and John Etchemendy, The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). (N. from the A.)

See Rosalie Colie, Paradoxia Epidemica, pp. 7-8. (N. from the A.)

Plato, Parmenides, in The Republic and Other Works, B. Jowett, tr. (New York: Doubleday, 1973), p. 379. (N. from the A.)

Ibid., p. 429. (N. from the A.)

Nicholas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, Germain Heron, tr. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). (N. from the A.)

A Neoplatonist thinker, Cusa therefore shares later Neoplatonists' view of the cosmos as a discordia concors. For a study of this view in relation to Don Quixote, see Leland Chambers, «Harmonia est Discordia Concors: The Coincidence of Opposites and Unity in Diversity in the Quijote, «Cervantes, su obra y su mundo, Actas del I Congreso internacional sobre Cervantes,Manuel Criado del Val , ed. (Madrid: EDI-6, 1981), pp. 605-615. For an excellent discussion of Renaissance Neoplatonism, including the place of Cusa, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic and Humanist Strains (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 48-69. A fine discussion of Cusa's thought can be found in Frederick Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1972), pp. 314-324. (N. from the A.)